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Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso began his second term Jan. 1. Less than two weeks
later, Brazil was hit with a new and potentially devastating economic crisis. In addition, Cardoso
faces growing unemployment and social problems and a fragile political alliance in Congress.
As he began his second term, Cardoso warned members of his governing alliance that he expects
more support in legislative matters. "I expect that the parties that support the government, really
support it, and the way to support it is to vote with it in Congress," said Cardoso. He also warned
members of his newly appointed Cabinet that their job security depends on their parties' support in
Congress.
Cardoso kept most of his key Cabinet members, including Finance Minister Pedro Malan and
Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia. His most controversial appointment was former foreign
minister Celso Lafter as Minister of Economic Development. Cardoso closed the ministries of
the army, navy and air force, folding them into one Defense Ministry under a civilian, Sen. Elcio
Alvares.

Former president's debt moratorium triggers crisis
The latest crisis was set in motion by Cardoso's predecessor, Itamar Franco (1992-1994). Cardoso had
barely begun his new term when Franco, now governor of Minas Gerais, announced a three-month
moratorium on payments of the state's US$13.5 billion debt to the central government. While the
amount involved is relatively small, the political tension that the threatened moratorium unleashed
jeopardized passage in Congress of key cost-cutting measures demanded by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Cardoso needs the support of Franco's Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB) to
pass his reform legislation. Shares on the Sao Paulo stock exchange immediately dropped 6.3%
as investors feared other states might follow Minas Gerais' lead. "What we're seeing is the Itamar
effect," said a trader with a bank in Sao Paulo. "Depending on how Cardoso deals with it, he could
see his support weaken in Congress." The administration moved quickly. On Jan. 11, Treasury
Secretary Eduardo Guimaraes announced that funds to cover the debt payment would be withheld
from Minas Gerais. The president issued a stern warning to other states after Franco's declaration of
a moratorium. "I will not allow the law to be ignored," said Cardoso. "The most senior authority in
this country is the president."
The governors of Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro states have said they might also be unable
to keep up payments on their debt to Brasilia, but said they would seek to renegotiate the debt and
not declare a moratorium. "The political battle between Itamar Franco and President Cardoso is
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escalating into the most critical confrontation the government has faced during the past four and
one half years," said Robert Gay with Bankers Trust. But Franco remained determined. He said he
will meet with opposition governors in his home state on Jan. 18, two days before Minas Gerais must
make an US$80 million debt payment or face US$700 million in fines.
Franco also criticized Cardoso for ignoring Brazil's social ills and for abusing the Plan Real,
introduced by then finance minister Cardoso at the end of Franco's term. "Today the president and
his economic team have taken the country into recession and unemployment," said Franco. "The
Plan Real was not created for this." As investors watched for the outcome of the political showdown
between Franco and Cardoso, the devaluation hit. Political crisis ends in devaluation On Jan. 14,
Central Bank president Gustavo Franco, one of the architects of Brazil's four-year economic recovery
and the staunchest defender of the country's controversial foreign- exchange policy, announced
his resignation, citing personal reasons. He was replaced by Franciso Lopes, the bank's director of
monetary policy.
Franco's resignation made public differences within Cardoso's administration between those
determined to defend the real and those pushing for a "contained" devaluation and lower interest
rates. The shock of Franco's resignation was followed quickly by the announcement that Brazil
would widen the band within which its currency, the real, trades against the dollar. The new band
from 1.20 to 1.32 reais rather than from 1.12 to 1.22 brought an 8.6% devaluation the first day. Lopes
insisted that the government's 1999 fiscal targets, agreed to with the IMF, remain in force despite the
change to the band system.
The devaluation, which many economists had been fearing, was followed by remarks from Lopes
that the real could face a 12% devaluation against the dollar in 1999. Concerns about a potential
ripple effect on the world economy sent stock prices plummeting across Latin America and Europe.
Nearly US$2 billion poured out of Brazil's foreign exchange markets in the next two days. The
resignation and the new policy "compound the fiscal problems for Brazil. Interest rates will rise.
It's the same story as Mexico back in 1995," said Miranda Xafa of Salomon Smith Barney. "The real
will float from here and definitely go lower. Franco was the one who put his foot down against the
floating currency."
Although the devaluation could eventually help the economy by making Brazilian exports cheaper
and by lowering interest rates, currency devaluations are often unpredictable. "A good example
is Mexico in the mid-90s," said Greg Mastel with the Economic Strategy Institute. "It tried to do a
moderate devaluation, but the market didn't accept it. It lost control of the currency, there was a
dramatic devaluation, and a subsequent recession even a depression in Mexico."
Brazil's Finance Minister Pedro Malan said the government devalued the currency to give officials
a flexibility which was not there before. Malan said he did not think another move would be
needed. "The fiscal program is on track," said Malan. "There is no reason for fear about our
ability to implement it as presented." Sherry Cooper with Nesbitt Burns Securities said, however,
that Brazil continues to face major challenges. "There are also great concerns about the political
instability within Brazil," said Cooper. "There has obviously been quite a bit of dissension as to
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the governmental policies, the slashing in fiscal expenditure, potential tax increases, as well as the
astronomical increases in interest rates."

IMF bailout criticized
Last November, the US and the IMF assembled the US$41.5 billion line of credit to help Brazil stave
off a crisis while implementing fiscal austerity. The agreement was part of a new IMF policy to aid
at-risk countries before financial problems became widespread (see NotiSur, 11/13/98). An initial
IMF payment of US$5.3 billion was transferred soon after the loan was approved on Dec. 2, and
Brazil can draw on an additional US$4.5 billion by late February, provided it has met the IMF terms.
Those terms require Brazil to use high interest rates to preserve investor trust in the real. The IMF's
plan, said Cooper, did not quite go as expected.
"The IMF was unable to forestall the mass exodus of foreign exchange and reserves from the
country, and Brazilians themselves lost confidence, so the inevitable result is the devaluation,"
Cooper said. "The question is how big it will be and when does the market level out." IMF
Managing Director Michel Camdessus urged Brazil to keep pushing for spending cuts to meet the
fiscal targets it agreed to. "We will be analyzing and discussing with the authorities in the coming
days the implications of the new developments for the various components of the economic policy
framework," he said.
The latest developments in Brazil pose huge problems for the IMF and infuriate critics who say the
fund has made a global crisis worse. Many economists say the IMF should have looked more closely
at the value of Brazil's currency before putting together the rescue deal. Instead, the package gave
investors time to pull out of Brazil but did not solve the country's underlying economic problems.
"They are now sitting with not just egg on their face, but with a terrible financial crisis, the
fifth consecutive failure of a major IMF bailout plan, starting with Thailand, Indonesia, Korea,
Russia, and now Brazil," said Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, a critic of the IMF. "The IMF,
US government, and Brazil agreed on a strategy last fall that Brazil try to defend a very heavily
overvalued exchange rate by using very, very high interest rates and try to combine that with budget
cuts. The combination was sending Brazil right over the cliff in terms of a deep contraction."
Some economists say the package was never credible. If it had been fully adopted, it would have
brought crippling recession. For that reason, the Congress has been dragging its feet in approving
the required cutbacks. Others place the blame on Brazil for failing to implement the package of
reforms. "It's a breach of the firewall that we spent months building around Brazil," said a Clinton
administration official. "It's hard to overestimate the anger around here about how the Brazilians
wasted time when they needed to deal with their problems."

Financial crisis sure to increase opposition
Meanwhile, the IMF's very unpopular strings are incompatible with President Cardoso's promise
to reduce unemployment, improve education and health care, and advance agrarian reform. Public
dissatisfaction with social and economic policies has been growing. Unemployment which climbed
from 4% to 8% of the economically active population during Cardoso's first term was a principal
concern of the administration before effects of the Asian and Russian crises hit the country.
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During his campaign for re-election, Cardoso promised to create 7.8 million jobs during his second
term, a promise considered unrealistic by his aides even before he began his second term. Cardoso's
hope to create more jobs and reduce poverty is further complicated given that many businesses
have already announced planned layoffs because of the financial downturn. A recent survey by the
Federacion de Industrias del Estado de Sao Paulo (FIESP), the country's most powerful business
group, confirmed that the government could not count on private employers to create more jobs.
The survey of 461 of the most important businesses in Sao Paulo, the nation's industrial hub, showed
that 56% did not expect to hire new employees and 40% expected to reduce their work force. In
addition, militant members of the Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST) are increasing their demands
for agrarian reform and protesting proposed budget cuts in that area. [Sources: Inter Press Service,
12/07/98; Clarin (Argentina), 12/23/98; Spanish news service EFE, 12/28/98, 12/29/98, 01/08/99;
Journal of Commerce, 01/08/99; Notimex, 01/06/99, 01/10/99; The Miami Herald, 01/01/99, 01/13/99;
CNN, 01/04/99, 01/13/98; El Nuevo Herald (Miami), 01/07/99, 01/10/99, 01/12/99, 01/13/98; Associated
Press, 01/13/99; Reuters, 01/07/99, 01/08/99, 01/10/99, 01/11-14/99; The New York Times, 01/14/99]
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